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Introduction
Alfred Kroeber’s “The Superorganic” is a classic of anthropological theory. Originally 
published in 1917 in American Anthropologist, the article drew important responses from 
Edward Sapir and Alexander Goldenweiser. Kroeber included material from the article in his 
textbook Anthropology: Race, Language, Culture, Psychology, and Prehistory. Kroeber's interest 
in the superorganic continued to develop in publications like Configurations of Cultural Growth. 
“The Superorganic” is central to understanding the thought of one of the founders of 
anthropology and indeed, the history of anthropological theory itself. And yet it is little read 
today. Why?
There are many reasons: editors of textbooks and anthologies rely on disciplinary histories of 
anthropology, often transmitted orally, rather than consulting the findings of professional 
historians of anthropology. Anthropology’s oral history is often forgetful of the richness and 
sophistication of early Boasian anthropology. But much of the blame can be laid at the feet of 
Kroeber himself. The essay is extremely long, and larded with multiple examples used to make 
the same point.It is written with very purple prose -- Matthew Bradley once opined that Kroeber 
“never used one word when three would do” -- and his Victorian styles seems incongruous today. 
This is especially true of the sexist and exoticist tone of his language, which is replete with 
phrases of male achievement and the mind of the ‘savage’. The essay is clearly written and 
structured, but there is little explicit signposting. When it comes to speaking for a contemporary 
audience, then, Kroeber is his own worst enemy.
In this occasional paper I present an edited version of “The Superorganic”. The original essay 
is around 19,000 words. I have cut it down to just under 8,000. The argument has been preserved 
in its entirety, including Kroeber’s discussion of historical figures such as Gustave Le Bon, 
because I believe his criticism of their thought is relevant in a world where their intellectual heirs 
are still active. In a few cases I have altered verbs and nouns for agreement when deleting text 
caused them to disagree. These are indicated with brackets. The goal has been to respect 
Kroeber’s argument and stylistic choices while presenting a slimmed-down version which can be 
taught in a single session in an undergraduate or graduate theory course.
I hope that this will become one of a series of papers which present early anthropological 
theory in a form that is accessible to everyone. There is today a tremendous amount of material 
which is open access. Much Boasian thought is now in the public domain, but is difficult to find 
and inconvenient to read. And frankly, once must already know what is in it in order to know it is 
worth finding in the first place. By cleaning and curating a selection of open access, I hope to 
make open access resources better known and to raise awareness of the actual history of 
anthropological theory.
Like Savage Minds itself, this series is a homebrew’d, DIY project that does not want to let 
the perfect be the enemy of the good. There may be typos or other errors in the manuscript. In 
future editions these may be corrected.
One of the ironies of “The Superorganic” is that Kroeber never actually uses the word 
anywhere in the essay except the title. What, then, is his argument? Kroeber begins the essay by 
asking the question: what is the nature of cultural evolution, and how does it contrast with 
‘organic’ evolution -- that is to say, with biological evolution as described by the then-new and 
4
ground-breaking science of genetics. It's a question typical of the Boasians: it is in dialogue with 
biology, but seeks to understand the autonomy of anthropology as a way of knowing.
Kroeber develops this contrast between the organic and cultural (which he also calls the 
social, or simply ‘civilization’) by way of a third term: mentality. On the one hand, Kroeber sees 
the mental lives of individuals as the biological substrate on which culture writes itself. On the 
other hand, individual psychology is ultimately ‘mechanical’ in the sense that chemistry and 
physics can be used to understand the biological constitution of the individual which results in 
their mentality. Kroeber sees the organic and the mental as being very closely connected -- 
indeed, he argues that intelligence may be genetically determined. But if the organic causes the 
mental, the mental does not, then, cause the cultural. Rather, culture operates on its own level of 
determination.
Predictably, Kroeber argues that organic racial difference cannot affect the growth of 
civilization. There are no superior races. But he also argues that individual organic endowment 
cannot affect civilization. Kroeber makes this argument through a discussion of the role of genius 
in shaping history. Even the greatest inventions, he argues, will only take root if a culture is 
prepared to accept them. And if a culture is ready for an innovation, then anyone with above 
average intelligence may be able to invent it. Both Darwin and Wallace imagined evolution, and 
neither would have been accepted if society was not ready for the idea. Here Kroeber is at his 
most deterministic, minimizing the role of individual agency and emphasizing what later 
anthropologists would call ‘structural factors’ in shaping human conduct.
How, then, could culture have originated if it is such a unique phenomena? Kroeber is careful 
to emphasize that there is no answer to this question, but suggests that human evolution led to a 
‘saltation’ in which culture as a qualitative distinct phenomena appeared. This position 
anticipates current work on culture as an emergent phenomena. It is also important to emphasize 
that in asking this question, Kroeber clearly sees the importance of biological anthropology and 
human evolutionary history to cultural anthropology.
Finally, Kroeber argues that the legitimacy of anthropology (or history, these terms are used 
interchangeably in a way that modern readers may find strange) is tied to the existence of culture. 
It is always possible to assign ‘mechanical’ causes to behavior because humans are organic. But 
in doing so, he argues, we miss the cultural dimension of conduct that makes human lives so 
unique. At the same time, Kroeber argues, art and literature conveys truths that are enduring, but 
which are aesthetic and not scientific. Thus Kroeber argues that history/anthropology represents a 
third way of knowing the human which avoids the organic reductionism of science, but which is 
more concrete than literature. Here Kroeber’s argument is ambiguous, and addresses several 
questions that future anthropologists will grapple with: Is anthropology a unique discipline 
because it has a unique subject matter? Or does anthropology have a unique method? Why not 
prefer a biological reduction of human action? Kroeber occupies several positions here, and the 
loose ends in this section of his argument would be taken up by future thinkers.
Kroeber is famous for having claimed that anthropology is the “most humanistic of the 
sciences and the most scientific of the humanities” and yet, ironically, this bon mot never appears 
in his writings -- it was a favorite saying of his that has been passed down to us from 
anthropology’s oral history. Hopefully the publication of an accessible version of this essay will 
give readers the opportunity to move beyond this wonderful, epigrammatic summary of 
Kroeber’s thought and experience the original in all its richness.
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The Superorganic
By Alfred Kroeber
A way of thought characteristic of our western civilization has been the formulation of 
complementary antitheses, a balancing of exclusive opposites. One of these pairs of ideas is that 
of the vital from the social, or in other phraseology, of the organic and the cultural. The implicit 
recognition of the difference between organic processes and social processes is of long standing. 
The formal distinction is however recent. In fact the full import of the significance of the 
antithesis may be said to be only dawning upon the world. For every occasion on which some 
human mind sharply separates organic and social forces, there are dozens of other times when 
the distinction between them is not thought of, or an actual confusion of the two ideas takes 
place.
One reason for this current confusion of the organic and the social is the predominance of the 
idea of evolution. This idea, one of the earliest, simplest, and also vaguest ever attained by the 
human mind, has received its strongest ground and fortification in the domain of the organic; in 
other words, through biological science. At the same time, there is an evolution, or growth of 
civilization. Human civilization or progress, which exists only in and through living members of 
the species, is so unmistakably similar to the evolution of plants and animals, that it has been 
inevitable that there should have been sweeping applications of the principles of organic 
development to the facts of cultural growth. This of course is reasoning by analogy, or arguing 
that because two things resemble each other in one point they will also be similar in others. In 
the absence of knowledge, such assumptions are justifiable as assumptions. Too often, however, 
their effect is to predetermine mental attitude, with the result that when the evidence begins to 
accumulate which could prove or disprove the assumption, this evidence is no longer viewed 
impartially and judiciously, but is merely disposed of in such a way as not to interfere with the 
established conviction into which the original tentative guess has long since turned.
This is what has happened in the field of organic and social evolution. The distinction 
between them, which is so obvious that to former ages it seemed too commonplace to remark 
upon. It even seems fair to say that this confusion has been greater and more general among 
those to whom study and scholarship are a daily pursuit than to the remainder of the world.
Many aspects of the difference between the organic and that in human life which is not 
organic, are so plain that a child can grasp them. Everyone is aware that we are born with certain 
powers and that we acquire others. No one has yet been found to assert that any human being is 
born with an inherent knowledge of the multiplication table; nor, on the other hand, to doubt that 
the children of a negro are born negroes through the operation of hereditary forces. Some 
qualities in every individual are however clearly debatable ground; and when the development of 
civilization as a whole and the evolution of life as a whole are compared, the distinction of the 
processes involved has too often been allowed to lapse.
Some millions of years ago natural selection caused birds to appear in the world. They sprang 
from reptiles. In this development, feathers were acquired and scales lost; the grasping faculty of 
the front legs was converted into an ability to sustain the body in the air. The birds had lost 
certain faculties which they once possessed, and presumably would still possess were it not for 
the acquisition of their wings. In the last few years human beings have also attained the power of 
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aerial locomotion. But the process by which this power was attained, and its effects on the 
species, are utterly different. A bird is born with a pair of wings, but we have invented the 
aeroplane. The bird renounced a potential pair of hands to get his wings; we keep all the organs 
of our forefathers but add to them the new ability. The growth of new species of animals consists 
of changes in their organic constitution. As regards the growth of civilization, on the other hand, 
change and progress can take place without any such constitutional alteration of the human 
species. 
We may compare human and animal beings when groups of them reach a new and arctic 
environment. The non-human mammal species comes to have heavy hair. And this difference is 
racial, not individual. Now there are people who look for the same sort of inborn peculiarities in 
the Eskimo, the Samoyed, and the Yahgan; and find them, because they look for them. In fact, 
what the human inhabitant of intemperate latitudes does, is not to develop a peculiar digestive 
system, any more than he grows hair. He changes his environment, and thereby is able to retain 
his original body unaltered. He builds a closed house, which keeps out the wind and retains the 
heat of his body. His baby, and his baby’s baby, and his hundredth descendant are born as naked, 
and unarmed physically, as he and his hundredth ancestor were born.
That this difference in method of resisting a difficult environment, as followed respectively 
by the polar bear species and the human Eskimo race, is absolute, need not be asserted. That the 
difference is deep, is unquestionable. That it is as important as it is often neglected, it is the 
object of this essay to establish.
It has long been the custom to say that man’s superior intelligence enables him to rise 
superior to such lowly needs. But this is not the significant point of the difference. The greater 
human intelligence in itself does not cause the differences that exist. This psychic superiority is 
only the indispensable condition of what is peculiarly human: civilization. Directly, it is the 
civilization in which every Eskimo is reared. The distinction between animal and man which 
counts is not that of the physical and mental, which is one of relative degree, but that of the 
organic and social, which is one of kind. The beast has mentality, and we have bodies; but in 
civilization man has something that no animal has.
It is only in small measure a question of high and low as between man and animal. Many 
purely instinctive activities of the beasts lead to far more complex and difficult achievements 
than some of the analogous customs of this or that human nation. The beaver is a far better 
architect than many a savage tribe. But the essential point is not that after all a man can do more 
than a beaver, or a beaver as much as a man; it is that all that a beaver accomplishes he does by 
one means, and a man by another. The rudest savage can be taught to saw and nail together 
boards, to mortar stone on stone, to sink foundations, to rear an iron frame. And who would be so 
rash as to affirm that one generation or a hundred or ten thousand of example and instruction 
would in the least measure convert the beaver into a carpenter or a bricklayer?
The mental activity of the animals is instinctive; the content of our minds comes to us 
through tradition. But tradition, what is “given through,” handed along, from one to another, is 
only a message. It must of course be carried; but the messenger after all is extrinsic to the news. 
So, a letter must be written; but as its significance is in the meaning of the words, as the value of 
a note is not in the fiber of the paper but in the characters inscribed on its surface, so tradition is 
something superadded to the organisms that bear it, imposed upon them, external to them. And as 
the same shred can bear any one of thousands of inscriptions, and can even be tolerably razed 
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and reinscribed, so it is with the human organism and the countless contents that civilization can 
pour into it. The essential difference between animal and man, in this illustration, is his structure 
and nature and texture are such that he is inscribable, and that the animal is not.
Exactly parallel to this is the relation of the instinctive and traditional, the organic and the 
social. The animal, so far as social influences are concerned, is as unsuitable as a dish of porridge 
is for writing material; or when like the beach sand, it is inscribable, by domestication, it can 
retain no permanent impression, as a species, and lends itself to no use. Hence it has no society, 
and therefore no history. Man, however, comprises two aspects: he is an organic substance, that 
can be viewed as a substance, and he is also a tablet that is written upon. One aspect is as valid 
and as justifiable as another; but it is a cardinal mistake to confuse the two views.
So, if the student of human achievement were to try to withdraw from the observation of the 
natural historian and the mechanical philosopher the human beings upon whom is inscribed the 
civilization which he himself investigates, he would be ridiculous. And when on the other hand, 
the biologist proposes to rewrite history, in whole or in part, through the medium of heredity, he 
reveals himself in no more favorable light.
There have been many attempts to make precise the distinction between instinct and 
civilization, between the organic and the social, between animal and man. But for the conception 
of the discrimination that is at once most complete and most compact, we must go back to 
Aristotle. “ Man is a political animal.” The word political has changed in import. We use instead 
the Latin term social. This, both philosopher and philologist tell us, is what the great Greek 
would have said were he speaking in English today. Man is a social animal, then; a social 
organism. He has organic constitution; but he has also civilization. To ignore one element is as 
short-sighted as to overlook the other; to convert one into the other, if each has its reality, is 
negation. The attempt today to treat the social as organic, to understand civilization as heredity, is 
as essentially narrow minded as the alleged mediaeval inclination to withdraw man from the 
realm of nature and from the ken of the scientist because he was believed to possess an 
immaterial soul.
But, unfortunately, the denial, and for every denial a dozen confusions, still persist[s]. They 
pervade the popular mind; and thence they rise, again and again, into the thoughts of avowed and 
recognized science. It seems, even, that in a hundred years we have retrograded. A century and 
two centuries ago, with a generous impulse, the leaders of thought devoted their energies, and the 
leaders of men their lives, to the cause that all men are equal. We have certainly gone back, in 
America and in Europe and in their colonies, in our application of the assumption. Hereditary 
racial differences of ability pass as approved doctrine, in many quarters. There are men of 
eminent learning who would be surprised to know that serious doubts were held in the matter. 
And yet not a single piece of evidence has yet been produced to support the assumption that the 
differences which one nation shows from another -- let alone the superiority of one people to 
another -- are racially inherent, that is organically founded.
Most ethnologists, at any rate, are convinced that the overwhelming mass of historical and 
miscalled racial facts that are now attributed to obscure organic causes, or at most are in dispute, 
will ultimately be viewed by everyone as social and as intelligible only in their social relations. 
That there may be a residuum in which hereditary influences have been operative, it would be 
dogmatic to deny; but even this residuum of organic agencies will perhaps be found to be 
operative in quite other manners than those which are customarily adduced at present.
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For the historian -- him who wishes to understand any sort of social phenomena -- it is an 
unavoidable necessity to disregard the organic and to deal only with the social. It is perhaps too 
much to expect any one wedded, deliberately or unknowingly, to organic explanations, to discard 
these wholly. But it does seem justifiable to stand unhesitatingly on the proposition that 
civilization and heredity are two things that operate in entirely separate ways.
One of the minds endowed with as eminent power of perception and formulation as any of 
our generation, Gustave Le Bon, has carried the interpretation of the social as organic to its 
consistent consequence. His Psychology of Peoples is an attempt to explain civilization on the 
basis of race. But his professed attempt to resolve the civilizational materials with which he deals 
directly into organic factors leads him to rest his solutions ultimately on such mystic essences as 
the “soul of a race.” As a scientific concept, a race soul is as intangible and useless as any phrase 
of mediaeval philosophy. If instead of soul of the race, the distinguished Frenchman had said 
spirit of civilization, or tendency or character of culture, his pronouncements would have 
commanded less appeal, because seeming vaguer; but he would not have had to rest his entire 
thought upon a supernatural idea antagonistic to the body of science to which he was trying to 
attach his work; and if non-mechanistic, his efforts at explanation would at least have earned the 
respect of historians. As a matter of fact, Le Bon clearly operates with social phenomena, 
however insistently he gives them organic names and proclaims that he has resolved them 
organically. 
From a less aggressive temperament springs the wail that Lester Ward has voiced for a wide 
and aspiringly earnest element. Heredity by acquirement must take place, he argues, or there 
would be no hope of permanent progress for humanity. To believe that what we have gained will 
not be at least in part implanted in our children removes the incentive to effort. All the labor 
bestowed upon the youth of the world would be in vain. Mental qualities are not subject to 
natural selection; hence they must be accumulated in man by acquirement and fixed by heredity. 
This view reveals the tenacity with which many conscientious intellects of the day can not see 
the social except through the glass of the organic. That this habit of mind can itself be 
depressing, that it forever prelimits development and eternally chains the future to the poverties 
and paucities of the present, does not dawn upon its devotees; it is in fact probably the fixity 
which gives it its emotional hold.
Of all the comminglings of the cultural with the vital, the eugenics movement is the most 
widely known and of directest appeal. As a constructive program for national progress, eugenics 
is a confusion of the purposes to breed better men and to give men better ideals; an organic 
device to attain the social; a biological short cut to a moral end. Eugenics, so far as it is more 
than an endeavor at social hygiene in a new field, is a fallacy. It is a mirage like the philosopher’s 
stone, and to those who are led by its learned modernity to receive it earnestly, it is a destructive 
snare. There is little to argue about it. If social phenomena are only organic, eugenics is right, 
and there is nothing more to be said. If the social is something more than the organic, eugenics is 
only an error and unclear thought at whose childlikeness the future will smile, and then pass on.
Galton, the founder of the eugenics propaganda, was one of the most truly imaginative 
intellects produced by his country. Pearson, its distinguished living protagonist, possesses one of 
the keenest minds of the generation. Hundreds of men of ability and eminence have professed 
themselves converts. It is plain that a simple fallacy must have presented itself in an envelope of 
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enticing complications to be acceptable to them. What then is the reason of the confusion into 
which they have precipitated themselves?
The cause seems to be a failure to distinguish between the social and the mental. All 
civilization in a sense exists only in the mind. Gunpowder, textile arts, machinery, laws, 
telephones are not themselves transmitted from man to man nor from generation to generation, at 
least not permanently. It is the perception, the knowledge and understanding of them, their ideas 
in the Platonic sense, that are passed along. Everything social can have existence only through 
mentality. Of course, civilization is not mental action itself; it is carried by men, without being in 
them. But its relation to mind, its absolute rooting in human faculty, is more than plain. What has 
occurred is that biology, which correlates and often identifies the physical and the mental, has 
gone one natural but as yet unjustified step further, and assumed the social as mental; whence the 
explanation of civilization in physiological and mechanical terms was an unavoidable 
consequence.
Now, the identification by modern science of the physical and mental is certainly justifiable 
as a method which can be employed toward a coherent explanation of phenomena, and which 
leads to practically useful results. This correlation is an unchallenged axiom of those who 
concern themselves with science: all mental equipment and all mental activity have an organic 
basis. This inseparability of physical and mental must be true also in the field of heredity. It is a 
matter of common experience that our own mental traits vary as much and as frequently tally 
with those of ancestors, as physical features. There is no logical reason, and nothing in the 
observation of daily life, that operates against the belief that an irascible temper is as heritable as 
the red hair with which it is traditionally associated. Of course there is much false inference in 
these matters. But it would be as unreasonable to exaggerate this caution into an outright denial 
of mental heredity, as to disregard it entirely. In spite of a wide acceptance of these 
demonstrations they have also met with some opposition, and with more ignoring than their 
bearing on a question of general interest warranted. In part this negative attitude may be due to a 
persistence of religious beliefs which see in every linkage of mind and body an effacement of the 
cherished distinction of body and soul. But this belated conservatism will not account for all the 
failure of the Galton-Pearson demonstrations.
The remainder of the opposition has been caused by Galton, Pearson, and their adherents 
themselves, who have not confined themselves to their well-supported conclusions, but have 
pressed on to further inferences that rest only on assertion. That heredity operates in the domain 
of mind as well as that of the body, is one thing; that therefore heredity is the mainspring of 
civilization is an entirely different proposition, without any necessary connection, and certainly 
without any established connection, with the former conclusion. To maintain both doctrines, the 
second as a necessary corollary of the first, has been the habit of the biological school; and the 
consequence has been that those whose intellectual inclinations were otherwise, or who followed 
another method of research, have avowedly or tacitly rejected both propositions.
The reason why mental heredity has nothing to do with civilization, is that civilization is not 
mental action but a body or stream of products of mental exercise. Any demonstration 
concerning [mental activity] consequently proves nothing whatever as to social events. Mentality 
relates to the individual. The social or cultural, on the other hand, is in its very essence non-
individual. Civilization, as such, begins only where the individual ends. But a thousand 
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individuals do not make a society. They are the potential basis of a society; but they do not 
themselves cause it; and they are also the basis of a thousand other potential societies.
The findings of biology as to heredity, mental and physical alike, may then be accepted 
without reservation. But that therefore civilization can be understood by psychological analysis 
or heredity, or that the destiny of nations can be predicted from an analysis of the organic 
constitution of their members, assumes that the social can be wholly resolved into the mental as 
it is thought this resolves into the physical. It is in the tempting leap from the individually mental 
to the culturally social that the source of the distracting transferences of the organic into the 
social is to be sought. A more exact examination of the relation of the two is therefore desirable.
In a brilliant essay on heredity in twins, Thorndike arrives at the conclusion that so far as the 
individual is concerned heredity is everything and environment nothing. This finding is not only 
thoroughly elucidated by the author, but has the support of our common experience in life. Every 
one numbers among his acquaintance individuals of energy, of address and skill, of what seems 
an uncanny prescience, or of a strength of character, that leave no doubts in our judgment that 
whatever their lot of birth, they would have risen above their fellows and been marked men and 
women. And on the other hand, we also admit regretfully the maladroit and sluggish, the 
incompetent and commonplace, who, born in any station, would have been of the mediocrities or 
unfortunates of their time and class. That Napoleon, set in another land and era, would not have 
conquered a continent,is sufficiently certain. It is important to realize that congenital differences 
can have no effect on the course of civilization. But it is equally important to realize that we may 
and must concede the existence of such differences and their inextinguishability.
The modern schoolboy knows more than Aristotle; but this fact does not in the least endow 
him with a fraction of the intellect of the great Greek. Socially --  because knowledge must be a 
social circumstance -- it is knowledge, and not the greater development of one individual or 
another, that counts. A hundred Aristotles among our cave-dwelling ancestors would have been 
Aristotles in their birthright no less; but they would have contributed far less to the advance of 
science than a dozen plodding mediocrities in the twentieth century. 
Genius and ability occur with regular frequency, and all races or large-enough groups of men 
average alike and the same in qualities. It follows that all so-called inventors or discoverers were 
unusually able men, endowed from before birth with superior faculties. On the other hand, the 
content of the invention or discovery springs in no way from the make-up of the great man, or 
that of his ancestors, but is a product purely of the civilization into which he with millions of 
others is born as a meaningless and regularly recurring event. Whether his invention is that of the 
cannon or the bow, is not explainable by biological science but finds its meaning only in such 
operations with the material of civilization as history is occupied with.
Darwin provides a beautiful exemplification of these principles. To deny this great man 
genius would be fatuous. On the other side, no one can sanely believe that the formulation of the 
doctrine of evolution by natural selection would now stand to his credit had he been born fifty 
years sooner or later. If later, he would have been infallibly anticipated by Wallace. Put on earth a 
half century earlier, his central idea would not have come to him as it failed to come to his 
brilliant predecessor, the evolutionist Lamarck. Or, it would have risen in his own mind only to 
be at once discarded as logically possible indeed, but as unworthy of actual consideration. Or, 
finally, the thought might indeed grow in him, but been ignored and forgotten by the world, a 
mere unfruitful accident, until European civilization was prepared to use it. That this last 
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possibility is no mere idle conjecture is evidenced by its actually taking place in the case of 
Gregor Mendel.
It is inconceivable that the independent occurrence of the idea of selection as the motive 
force of organic evolution, synchronously in the minds of Darwin and Wallace, should have been 
an affair of pure chance. The immediate acceptance of the idea by the world, proves nothing as to 
the intrinsic truth of the concept; but it does establish the readiness of the world for the doctrine. 
The enunciation seems to have been destined to come almost precisely when it did come. Darwin 
carried with himself the germ of the idea of natural selection for twenty long years before he 
dared put forward the hypothesis which previously he had felt would be received with hostility. It 
was only the briefer expression of the same insight by Wallace that led Darwin to publicity. Can 
it be imagined, if Wallace had met death at sea among the Malay islands, and Darwin, unspurred 
by his competitor colleague’s activity, had carried his theory in hesitant privacy a few years 
longer and then suddenly succumbed to mortal illness, that we of the civilized world of today 
should have lived all our intellectual lives without a definite mechanism for evolution? That our 
biologists would be still standing where Linnaeus, Cuvier, or at most Lamarck stood? If so, the 
great currents of history would be absolutely conditioned by the lodgement or dislodgement of a 
bacillus in a particular human frame on a certain day. No. Wallace’s crowding on Darwin’s heels 
evidences that behind him trod still others, and that had the leader or his second fallen, the 
followers, one or several or many, would have been pressed forward and done their work-
immediately, as history reckons time.
The total failure of Mendel’s revolutionizing experiments in heredity to achieve recognition 
during their author’s life has already been alluded to as an instance of the inexorable fate in store 
for the discoverer who anticipates his time. It has been said that Mendel’s essay was published in 
a little known source, and therefore failed to come to the notice of biologists. It is far more likely 
that biologist after biologist saw the essay, that some even read it, but that it remained 
meaningless to them because they lacked the transcendent superiority of the occasional 
individual to see issues that lie ahead of those with which the world of their day is wrestling. 
Slowly, however, time rolled on and unconsciously a change of content of thought was 
preparing. The investigations of De Vries and Bateson were accumulating knowledge as to the 
actual operation of heredity. And then suddenly in 1900, with dramatic eclat, three students, 
independently and “within a few weeks of each other,” discovered the discovery of Mendel, and 
a new science was launched on a career of splendid fulfillment.
There may be those who see in these pulsing events only a meaningless play of capricious 
fortuitousness; but there will be others to whom they reveal a glimpse of a great and inspiring 
inevitability which rises as far above the accidents of personality as the march of the heavens 
transcends the wavering contacts of random footprints on clods of earth. Wipe out the perception 
of De Vries, Correns, and Tschermak, and it is yet certain that before another year had rolled 
around, the principles of Mendelian heredity would have been proclaimed by six rather than 
three discerning minds. Mendelian heredity does not date from 1865 [when Mendel published]. 
It was discovered in 1900 because it could have been discovered only then, and because it 
infallibly must have been discovered then.
The whole history of inventions is one endless chain of parallel instances. The right to the 
monopoly of the manufacture of the telephone was long in litigation; the ultimate decision rested 
on an interval of hours between the recording of concurrent descriptions by Alexander Bell and 
7
Elisha Gray. The discovery of oxygen is credited to both Priestley and Scheele; its liquefaction to 
Cailletet as well as to Pictet, whose results were attained in the same month of 1877 and 
announced in one session. Kant as well as La Place can lay claim to the promulgation of the 
nebular hypothesis. Neptune was predicted by Adams and by Leverrier; the computation of the 
one, and the publication of that of the other, had precedence by a few months. For the invention 
of the steamboat, glory is claimed by their countrymen or partisans for Fulton, Jouffroy, Rumsey, 
Stevens, Symmington, and others; of the telegraph, for Steinheil and Morse; in photography 
Talbot was the rival of Daguerre and Niepce. The doubly flanged rail devised by Stevens was 
reinvented by Vignolet. Aluminum was first practically reduced by the processes of Hall, 
Héroult, and Cowles. Leibnitz in 1684 as well as Newton in 1687 formulated calculus. 
Anaesthetics, both ether and nitrous oxide, were discovered in 1845 and 1846, by no less than 
four men of one nationality. So independent were their achievements, so similar even in details 
and so closely contemporaneous, that polemics, lawsuits, and political agitation ensued for years. 
Even the south pole, never before trodden by the foot of human beings, was at last reached twice 
in one summer. A volume could be written filled with endlessly repeating but ever new 
accumulation of such instances. 
When interest shifts from individually biographic elements and attaches whole heartedly to 
the social, evidence on this point will be infinite in quantity, and the presence of a majestic order 
pervading civilization will be irresistibly evident. Knowing the civilization of an age and a land, 
we substantially affirm that its distinctive discoveries were not directly contingent upon the 
personality of the actual inventors that graced the period, but would have been made without 
them; and that, conversely, had the great illuminating minds of other centuries and climates been 
born in the civilization referred to, instead of their own, its first achievements would have fallen 
to their lot. 
Some reservations must be admitted to this principle. It is far from established that 
extraordinary ability is identical in direction. It is highly unlikely that Beethoven put in Newton’s 
cradle would have worked out calculus, or the latter have given the symphony its final form. It is 
a debatable point, though one of the greatest psychological interest, how far human faculty is 
divisible and subdivisible into distinct kinds. But the matter is not vital in the present connection.
Here, then, we have an interpretation which allows to the individual, and through him to 
heredity, all that the science of the organic can legitimately claim on the strength of its actual 
accomplishments; and which also yields the fullest scope to the social in its own distinctive field. 
The accomplishment of the individual measured against other individuals depends on his organic 
constitution as compounded by his heredity. The accomplishments of a group are uninfluenced 
by heredity because sufficiently large groups average alike in organic make-up.
This identity of average is incontestable for some instances of the same nations in closely 
successive ages -- as Athens in 550 and 450 -- during which brief periods their hereditary 
composition could not possibly have altered to even a small fraction of the degree in which 
cultural achievement varied; it is certain probably even for people of the same blood separated 
by long intervals of time and wide divergences of civilization; and it is likely to be substantially 
true, as suggested before, for the most distant races. The difference between the 
accomplishments of one group and those of another is therefore of another order from the 
difference between the faculties of one person and another. It is through this distinction that one 
of the essential qualities of the nature of the social is to be found.
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The physiological and the mental are bonded as aspects of the same thing, one resolvable into 
the other; the social is, directly considered, irresolvable into the mental. That it exists only after 
mentality of a certain kind is in action has led to confusion of the two, and even to their 
identification. The error of this identification is a fault that tends to pervade modern thinking 
about civilization, and which must be overcome by self-discipline before our understanding of 
this order of phenomena that fill and color our lives can become either clear or serviceable.
If the relation of the individual to culture here outlined is a true one, a conflicting view 
sometimes held and already alluded to, is unentertainable. This view is the opinion that all 
personalities are potentially equal in capacity, their varying degrees of accomplishment due 
solely to different measures of accord with the social environment with which they are in touch. 
This,view seems to underlie many tendencies toward social and educational reform. This 
assumption, which would be of extensive practical application if verified, seems to rest 
ultimately upon a dim but profound perception of the influence of civilization. More complete 
that this influence of civilization is upon national fortunes than upon individual careers, it 
nevertheless must influence these latter also. Mohammedanism - a social phenomenon - in 
stifling the imitative possibilities of the pictorial and plastic arts, has obviously affected the 
civilization of many peoples; but it must also have altered the careers of many persons born in 
three continents during a thousand years. Special talents which these men and women possessed 
may have been suppressed. Of such individuals it is true that the social forces to which they were 
subject depressed each of them from successful attainment to more mediocre. And the same 
environment elevated many an individual above his fellows. The personality born with those 
qualities that lead to highly successful leadership of religious brigands, for instance, is 
undoubtedly assured of a more prosperous and contented career in Morocco than in Holland of 
today.
But, that a social environment may somewhat affect the fortunes and career of the individual 
does not prove that the individual is wholly the product of circumstances, any more than it means 
that the opposite is true and a civilization is only the sum total of the products of a group of 
organically shaped minds. The concrete effect of each individual upon civilization is determined 
by civilization itself. Civilization appears even in some cases and in some measure to influence 
the effect of the individual's native activities upon himself. But to proceed from these realizations 
to the inference that all the degree and quality of accomplishment by the individual is the result 
of his moulding by the society that encompasses him, is pure assumption and directly at variance 
with all observation. Therefore it is possible to hold to the historical or civilizational 
interpretation of social phenomena without proceeding to occupy the position [that] human 
beings [are] only and wholly the products of its stream. Because culture rests on specific human 
faculty, it does not follow that this faculty is of social determination. 
The line between the social and the organic may not be randomly or hastily drawn. The 
threshold between the endowment that renders the flow and continuance of civilization possible 
and that which prohibits even its inception is in all probability, but gaping for a longer period 
than our knowledge covers. The separation between the social itself, and the non-social, the pre-
social or organic, is the diversity of quality or nature which exists between animal and man on 
the one hand, and the products of the interactions of human beings on the other. It is necessary to 
eliminate the factor of individual capacity from the consideration of civilization. But this 
elimination means its transfer to the group of organically conceivable phenomena, not its denial.
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In short, social science, if we may take that word as equivalent to history, does not deny 
individuality any more than it denies the individual. It does refuse to deal with either 
individuality or individuals. And it bases this refusal solely on its denial of the validity of either 
factor for the achievement of its proper aims.
It is true that historical events can be viewed mechanically, and expressed ultimately in terms 
of physics and chemistry. Genius may prove definable in the constitution of chromosomes. The 
day may come when what took place in the tissue of Darwin’s brain when he first thought the 
concept of natural selection, can be profitably studied by the physiologist and chemist. Such an 
achievement, shockingly destructive as it may seem to those whom revelation appals, would be 
not only defensible, but worth while. Only, it would not be history; nor a step toward history or 
social science. To know the precise reactions in Darwin’s nervous system at the moment when 
the thought of natural selection flashed upon him in 1838, would involve a very genuine triumph 
of science. But it would mean nothing historically, since history is concerned with the relation of 
doctrines such as that of natural selection to other concepts and social phenomena, and not at all 
with the relation of Darwin himself to social phenomena or other phenomena.
There are those, of mechanistic proclivities and interests, who hold that it is only when 
historical events are explained on a basis like that assumed in our example, that history will have 
any significance. They have pressed their view until it has come to be widely accepted. But it is 
true only if a single method of thought is the sole one to be accorded validity and justifiability. If 
the ability to weigh the moon renders Shelley's poetry a useless superfluity, well and good: there 
is nothing more to be said. There actually are people fanatic enough to take such a stand. But if 
scientific methods give science, and artistic exercise yields literature, and the two do not exclude 
each other because they do not come into conflict and are not even comparable; if the 
justification of each is in its results and not in any toleration extended by the other; and if the 
truly unforgivable sin is not to practise one without regard to the other but to practise one by 
means of the other -- then, too, it is conceivable that there may be a third activity, neither science 
nor art, but history, the understanding of the social, which has an aim that cannot be denied and 
whose justification must be sought in its own results and not by the standard of any other activity. 
That is all that history as an intellectual manifestation can ask; but that it must ask.
History, then, justifies itself in proportion that it is mechanistically “unscientific”; that it has 
its own method, its own equivalent to the causality of science; and, in one sense, its own 
material. Not that there is a range of subjects that can be delimited and assigned respectively to 
science and to history. But the same phenomenon can after all be viewed with different ends. The 
social is scientifically resolvable; but it is resolvable through the individual -- the organic and 
psychic individual. History deals with the social by resolving it into the social without the 
medium of the individual.
Science will attack historical material -- social material -- by converting it into organic terms 
-- whether psychical or physical does not matter, so long as the ever present individual 
physiological aspect or basis of the social phenomena is dealt with. These organic results will 
then be ready for interpretation by the methods of physics and chemistry. Thus the material will 
be made part of the system that is pervaded by the principle of mechanical causality as its 
essence. But history, without denying this principle, keeps its intent fixed upon the facts of the 
social plane, upon historical data.
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As, then, there are two lines of intellectual endeavor in history and in science, each with its 
separate aim and set of methods so also two wholly disparate evolutions must be recognized: that 
of the substance which we call organic and that of the other substance called social. Social 
evolution is without antecedents in the beginnings of organic evolution. It commences late in the 
development of life - long after vertebrates, after mammals, after the primates even, are 
established. Its exact point of origin we do not know, but we can limit the range within which it 
falls. This origin occurred in a series of organic forms more advanced, in general mental faculty, 
than the gorilla, and much less developed than the man of Neandertal and Le Moustier. In point 
of time, these first carriers of the rudiments of civilization must antedate the Neandertal race by 
far, but must be much posterior to other extinct human ancestors of the approximate intellectual 
level of the modern gorilla and chimpanzee.
The beginning of social evolution, of the civilization which is the subject of history, thus 
coincides with that mystery of the popular mind: the missing link. But the term “link” is 
misleading. It implies a continuous chain, a strand that is the same in texture before and beyond 
the break in knowledge. But with the unknown bearers of the primeval and gradually manifesting 
beginnings of civilization, there took place a profound alteration rather than an improved passing 
on of the existing. A new factor had arisen which was to work out its own independent 
consequences, a factor that had passed beyond natural selection, that was no longer wholly 
dependent on any agency of organic evolution, and that, however swayed by the oscillations of 
the heredity that underlay it, nevertheless floated unimmersibly upon it.
The dawn of the social thus is not a link in any chain, but a leap to another plane. It may be 
likened to the first occurrence of life in the hitherto lifeless universe. Atomic qualities and 
movements were not interfered with when that seemingly slight event took place; the majesty of 
the mechanical laws of the cosmos was not diminished ; but something new was inextinghshably 
added to the history of this planet. Or, one might compare the inception of civilization to the end 
of the process of slowly heating water. The expansion of the liquid goes on a long time. Its 
alteration can be observed by the thermometer as well as in bulk, in its solvent power as well as 
in its internal agitation. But it remains water. Finally, however, the boiling point is attained. 
Steam is produced: and in place of a glistening percolating fluid, a volatile gas diffuses invisibly. 
Neither the laws of physics nor those of chemistry are violated; nature is not set aside; but yet a 
saltation has taken place: the slow transitions that accumulated from zero to one hundred have 
been transcended in an instant, and a condition of substance with new properties and new 
possibilities of effect is in existence. Such, in some manner, must have been the result of the 
appearance of this new thing, civilization. 
To assert, because [civilization] has risen rapidly, [the organic] must also have ascended 
proportionally is obviously uncompelling. That our institutions have advanced dizzyingly in 
twenty thousand years is no reason that our mental equipment and its physiological basis, have 
advanced in any corresponding measure. If anything, it might rather be an evidence that the 
lower, organic line has fallen off in its rate of ascent. The bodies and minds in this line have 
continued to carry civilization; but this civilization has met the struggle of the world in such a 
way that much of the stress has been directed from these bodies and minds. We do not argue that 
the progress of organic evolution is prima facie indication that inorganic matter is more complex 
or in any sense “higher,” than it was fifty million years ago; much less that organic evolution has 
taken place through an inorganic evolution as cause. But all the evidence directs us to the 
conviction that in recent periods civilization has raced at a speed so far outstripping the pace of 
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hereditary evolution, that the latter has, if not actually standing still, afforded all the seeming of 
making no progress. There are a hundred elements of civilization where there was one in the time 
when the Neandertal skull enclosed a living brain; and not only the content of civilization but the 
complexity of its organization has increased a hundredfold. But the body and the associated mind 
of that early man have not attained a point a hundred times, nor even twice, as fine, as efficient, 
as delicate, or as strong, as they were then.
Here, then, we have to come to our conclusion. The mind and the body are but facets of the 
same organic material or activity; the social substance, the existence that we call civilization, 
transcends them utterly for all its being forever rooted in life. The processes of civilizational 
activity are almost unknown to us. The self-sufficient factors that govern their workings are 
unresolved. The forces and principles of mechanistic science can indeed analyze our civilization; 
but in so doing they destroy its essence, and leave us without understanding of the very thing 
which we seek. The historian as yet can do little but picture. He traces and he connects what 
seems far removed; he balances; he integrates; but he does not really explain, nor does he 
transmute phenomena into something else. His method is not science; but neither can the 
scientist deal with historical material and leave it civilization, nor anything resembling 
civilization, nor convert it wholly into concepts of life and leave nothing else to be done. What 
we all are able to do is to realize this gap, to be impressed by its abyss with reverence and 
humility, and to go our paths on its respective sides without self-deluding attempts to bridge the 
eternal chasm, or empty boasts that its span is achieved.
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